

**The Irreducible Image:  
Finding the *Imago Dei* in the Aftermath of Genocide**  
*a theology of the cross*  
by Mary Emily Briehl Duba

The fire burned for two days. Serbian forces bombed the Sarajevo National Library—the equivalent of the United States Library of Congress—on August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1992. In a stirring essay written in the aftermath of the bombing, the head librarian recalls watching as “fragile pages of grey ashes floated down like a dirty black snow.”<sup>i</sup> This work of violence against the Bosnian people has been called a “cultural genocide,” a systematic attempt to strip a people of their cultural identity, to reduce human life to its creaturely core—in short, to de-humanize. The librarian ruminates on such violence: “I think the aim of this kind of aggression, against museums, against libraries, is to erase our remembrance of who we are.”<sup>ii</sup>

Without remembrance of who we are, who are we? When violence strips us of our culture, history, relationships, and sense of personal and communal identity, who remains? These questions presuppose that the human person is more than a sedimentation of accidental qualities, that the human person bears a constitutive element that no act of violence can destroy. Theological anthropologies commonly claim that this irreducible, unstrippable element borne by humanity as such is the *imago Dei*, the image of God.

The Christian theological tradition has produced myriad explanations of the meaning of the *imago Dei*. Given by God to humankind at creation, the image of God signifies humanity’s distinction from the rest of the created order. It grants to the human person a place of dignity, a place of honor. Yet, around the world, violence strips human beings not only of their place of dignity, but of any place at all. Violence aimed at the systematic de-humanization of whole peoples demands a theological response. In this essay I take up the question of whether violence has the power to de-humanize, to strip a person of that which makes him or her human. I argue for an

understanding of the *imago Dei* that respects the depth and breadth of human suffering and still dares to answer in the negative. Violence is rendered ultimately powerless by the irreducible, unstrippable, essential core of the human person: God's own image, the crucified Christ.

Methodologically, I take up the work of theological anthropology with the particular spirit and method of the theology of the cross. This methodology wards against several common stumbling blocks. It avoids the idealization of the human person, which can occur when the meaning of the image of God is derived from doctrines of creation. It prevents abstraction from the vulnerabilities of the human body, as can occur when the image of God is derived from doctrines of eschatology. Working "under the cross," I argue, results in a theological anthropology that takes seriously the lived reality of genocidal violence in our world and the redemptive presence of an incarnate, crucified God.

This paper will unfold in five movements. First, I will problematize the question at hand: namely, what is the essence of the human person such that violence ultimately lacks the power to de-humanize? I will address feminist critiques of an "essentializing" tendency in my thought, and argue for the necessity of establishing an un-constructed (and therefore unable to be deconstructed) center of the human person in light of the problem of genocide. Second, I will offer a cursory review of how Alistair McFadyen approaches this very task. Third, I will propose the theology of the cross as an alternative lens through which to understand the meaning of the *imago Dei* in the context of genocide. Fourth, I will argue that when viewed from "under the cross" the image of God according to which humanity has been made is Jesus Christ, the crucified God, the irreducible, unstrippable gift of Godself. Fifth, I will explore the ethical implications of making Christ the constitutive center of humanity. Ultimately, I will conclude (with appreciation for the mixed metaphor) that the divine image is the one true Word that can be spoken about the meaning and

resilience of human life. Jesus Christ—Image and Word of God—stands in nonviolent protest before every force of violence in our world and in our selves.

### **Problematizing the Question in the Context of Genocide**

The image of God often has been understood as something belonging to the human person in its distinction from other creatures. According to Genesis, bearing the image of God makes humanity worthy of having dominion over the rest of creation (Gen 1.26). It is the essential element, the unchanging principle, that constitutes the human person as such. The question of the *content* of the image of God—the what-it-is—is central to the task of theological anthropology. If the image of God is the essential element of the human person—one argument goes—then we could discover the content of the divine image by stripping away every “accidental” quality.

Post-modern critics problematize this logic on at least two fronts: the presumption that there is an essentialized core of the human person and the presumption that everything concrete and particular about a person is accessory to his or her humanity. Feminist scholars in particular level strong critiques against these presuppositions. It is problematic, they argue, to define the human person according to its possession of any essential, constitutive element. To do so sets normative terms by which to judge authentic humanity. Normative standards enable us to distinguish the human from the non-human, the worthy from the unworthy.

Essentialization remains problematic even when the essential element is the image of God itself. For what *is* this elusive image of God? If the content of the divine image is rationality, then the humanity of those without the capacity for cognitive reasoning is denied. If to bear the image of God is to be spiritual or relational, to will or to love, we risk labeling some people “fully human” and others “exceptions to the rule” of humanity. To be an “exception to the rule” is not neutral—not simply a matter of “difference”—because people who fall outside the normative standard are considered deviant, dangerous, less than whole. Historically, the normative human person, the true

bearer of the *imago Dei*, has been equated with a rational, able-bodied, male of European descent. Instead of grounding “true humanity” at the site of a perceived similarity—argue post-modern critics—the “truly human” must be grounded in the “truly other.” All human persons deserve reverence precisely because of the concrete particularities of their otherness.

This critique of essentialism is critical in the context of genocide. The very ideology of genocide depends on the ability of the militarily powerful to define what it means to be human. *They* define the normative standard by which humanness is judged. Communities or individuals who do not fit this normative standard are pronounced less than human and treated as such. The post-modern move away from essentializing the human person is an attempt to protect the dignity and difference of every human person.

While I affirm this impulse, I find the predominant alternative to essentialism—constructionism—to be just as problematic in the context of genocide. Constructionism posits that the human person is a composite of particularities. Culture, language, relationships, physical traits, etc., are not accidental or accessory to our humanity; rather, we are constructed by the innumerable concrete particularities of our lives. In this way, constructionism successfully renounces the *ideology* of genocide by refusing to “annihilate difference.”<sup>iii</sup> Inadvertently, however, constructionism contributes to the *engineering* of genocide. Serene Jones writes, “The entire system of symbols, languages, beliefs, actions, and attitudes within which persons live and organize and make sense of their world and actions are human artifacts, not pre-given, natural facts.”<sup>iv</sup> Genocide is staged upon the assumption that since these “human artifacts” can be systematically destroyed—as in the case of the symbolic bombing of the Sarajevo National Library—the people constructed by them will have lost their personhood, their humanity. Memory, culture, individual and communal identity: constructionism places the burden of proof for humanity on constructions that can be destroyed, stripped away, and violated.

In summary, genocide depends on both essentialism, for defining who is worthy of human dignity, and constructionism, for engineering the process of dehumanization. To both of these methodologies, a truly theological anthropology must speak a resounding No! Lest we reinscribe this logic of death, we must define humanity such that violence cannot strip it away. Theologically speaking, we must define what it is to be human in terms that affirm the good news of the Gospel: that death does not have the final word, the final claim on who we are.

### **Relationality: McFadyen's Alternative**

Given the problems that both essentialism and constructionism pose, how ought we to understand what it is to be human? Alistair McFadyen takes up this very question. In *The Call to Personhood* he argues that to be human is to be a dialogue partner with God. God speaks first, addressing humanity with an eternal Word, the Word through whom all things came into being. To be bear the divine image is to be “a response to an eternal address.”<sup>v</sup> In this way, the human person is not internally self-constituting, but “constituted by God’s prevenient, creative communication as a being in response.”<sup>vi</sup> Being “truly human” does not depend on possession of any particular qualities, capacities, or actions. Rather the humanity of each and every person is constituted by God’s own quality, capacity, and action. McFadyen grants the human person a substantial center, but avoids essentialization since each person’s center is constituted by his or her own significant social relationships.

Harriet Harris poses an important critique to McFadyen’s work. She worries that defining personhood according to relationality allows for the danger that someone could be described as not a person. She writes that McFadyen’s proposal “means that all human beings are created as relational, but that they might be inauthentic persons if their relations are distorted.”<sup>vii</sup> This critique matters greatly in the context of genocide. In cultural and religious genocides, relations between persons are intentionally distorted in order to facilitate cultural and personal disintegration. For

example, in Bosnia—as in many genocides—the weapon of sexualized violence was used to disintegrate familial and neighborly relationships. In honor-based cultures, women who have been raped are often cut off from their families, deemed unsuitable for marriage and life in the community.

In the context of genocide, affirming humanity and personhood on the basis of relationality is not sufficient. Relationships can be distorted and used as weapons against those whose selfhoods they constitute. Dialogue—“respect for freedom and independence and an absence of overdetermination”—is the first casualty of genocide.<sup>viii</sup> If we are dialectically constituted we have no final resting place of selfhood, no center that cannot be distorted by unjust relationality with those who wish us harm. When our families, homes, bodies, and religious beliefs are threatened, dismantled, and violated even the deepest of “deep selves” come unraveled. Relationality is central to human life and an important part of human health and joy, but its potential for abuse and distortion is so great that it ought not be called the center of our personhood. We must insist that humanity be centered on something that no force of violence can distort, something that one’s victim-hood cannot define.

McFadyen hopes to avoid this critique with his premise that we are called into personhood by God, who initiates and sustains our personhood even when violence is done to our personal identity. God constitutes our personhood; human relationships constitute our personality. His thought is deeply compelling. Yet it relies on drawing a distinction between *what* a human being is as a response to God’s initiating Word and *who* a human person is as a unique self in the world. In the context of genocide the human person is treated not as a *who* but as a *what*, not as a person but as a thing. We must insist otherwise. We must insist that the human person, the bearer of the *imago Dei*, is human not only because of *what* he or she is as a creation of God, but because of *who* he or she is as a beloved child of God.

## Theology of the Cross: Spirit and Method

The theology of the cross is not a systematic theology. It is, as Jurgen Moltmann has said, “the *key signature* for all Christian theology.”<sup>ix</sup> To borrow a phrase from Douglas John Hall, the theology of the cross is a “spirit and method” by which a person may engage any theological endeavor. He writes, “The theology of the cross is not an ‘it’—not a specific and objectifiable set of teachings or dogmas; not ‘a theology’—it is, rather, a spirit and a method that one brings to all one’s reflections on the various areas and facets of Christian faith and life.”<sup>x</sup> In this section, I will outline the primary commitments that characterize this spirit and method. Then I will discuss why the theology of the cross is an appropriate spirit and method by which to do theological anthropology in the context of genocide.

At its heart, the theology of the cross is about God. It describes the whole of human experience on the basis of who God is, why God acts, and how God reveals Godself. Therefore, theologians of the cross do not fear paradox or ambiguity. They do not avoid hard realities or turn to idols of false optimism for comfort. The theology of the cross requires a commitment to speaking honestly about human experience. Described in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as “Christian realism,” the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518 described the commitment to honesty this way: “the theologian of the cross calls things by their proper name.”<sup>xi</sup> Theologians of the cross engage in radical truth-telling, even and especially when those truths are paradoxical, ambiguous, and ugly.

The theology of the cross is deeply incarnational. It takes human bodies, communal bodies, and the fragility of personhood seriously. This commitment reflects a belief in God’s own desire to honor the incarnate life by dwelling among us. The God who longs to be Emmanuel in our world is, according to the theology of the cross, a God of compassionate solidarity. This God did not send a surrogate, but became for us the “crucified God,” the God whose triumph is “hidden beneath its apparent opposite.”<sup>xii</sup> Looking at the world from under the cross, we see the paradox that death

leads to life, that God's weakness on the cross reveals God's power, and that in God's Reign the last will be first of all: "For the foolishness of God is wiser than human wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than human strength" (1 Cor 1:25).<sup>xiii</sup>

Given the profundity of God's love for creation, the theology of the cross maintains a radical commitment to engagement with the world. It does not smooth out the complexities and pains of the world with tidy metaphysical systems; in fact, theology under the cross is "never satisfied with being theology" at all, but blurs the division between theology and ethics.<sup>xiv</sup> Dietrich Bonhoeffer—a 20<sup>th</sup> century theologian of the cross—writes that this kind of theology "sends [a person] back into life on earth in a wholly new way."<sup>xv</sup> In summary, the theology of the cross is a commitment to seeking the revelation of the crucified God, practicing radical truth-telling, remaining contextual and incarnational, seeking wisdom in paradox, and engaging the world at the site of brokenness.

These commitments make the theology of the cross a particularly appropriate spirit and method for doing theological anthropology in the context of genocide. War distorts truths—truths about historical events as well as truths about the dignity of the human person. To seek understanding of God's relationship to humanity in the context of genocide requires a robust commitment to truth-telling, including a recognition of and respect for a multiplicity of truths. War draws lines—lines intended to "clarify" ambiguities about who is enemy and who is ally. The theology of the cross preserves truths revealed in paradox. Complexities and ambiguities are not problems, but evidence of the surprising work of God. War harms bodies—bodies of persons and communities. The theology of the cross takes seriously the embodied experience of humanity, pointing to the incarnation as evidence of God's own attention to and care for the embodied life. The terror of war is difficult to face. Critics of the theology of the cross often argue that we would do better to keep our gaze locked on the promise of the resurrection, not the horror of the cross. I



argue for the theology of the cross in the context of genocide for this very reason. It is dishonest to use theology to make genocide palatable to our sensibilities. To do theology in the context of genocide, we must be prepared to look, and look hard, at the cross.

### **The Image of God at the Site of Genocide**

The 1948 Geneva Convention defines genocide as any of various violent acts “committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”<sup>xvi</sup> It is in every way a systematic assault on the integrity and goodness of life itself. For this reason it may seem an unlikely place to discern the meaning of the image of God. We do not seek to understand the character of God by looking to a doctrine of sin; therefore, why seek God’s image in the context of genocide? If genocide mirrors any image, it is the image of human depravity, not the image of a compassionate God. Nevertheless, despite all logic and empirical evidence, even at the site of extreme violence, God is found. The glory of God’s image is hidden in its apparent opposite.

With the theology of the cross as our spirit and method, we begin with a radical commitment to truth telling. A theologian of the cross tells the truth about the world, boldly naming evil as such. Let us begin by telling the truth about genocide. Genocide is a manifestation of evil. It is a systematic attempt to strip a human community of its humanity, to define a group of people as less-than-human. Practitioners of genocide strategically target human dignity, convincing themselves—and often the on-looking world—that their victims are not human beings at all, but animals, deviants, evil-doers undeserving of life or compassion. Truth telling demands that we declare: genocide has happened and is still happening. The United Nations passed its definition of genocide in 1948, but the practice of using lethal violence on entire human communities goes back as far as recorded human history, from Carthage to Jericho. At the time of this writing, there are on-going mass killings in multiple countries around the world, killings conducted strategically and

systematically. The naming of genocide is a political act. Some of the mass killings happening at this moment have been legally deemed “genocide.” This places a legal responsibility on other nations of the world, including the United States, to intervene. Other mass killings have not been legally deemed “genocide,” not because there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the violence, but because naming it as such requires a response that the rest of the world is not ready or willing to give. Theologians of the cross commit to “calling a thing what it is” and to accepting the repercussions and responsibilities of telling such truths.

A theologian of the cross also tells the truth about God and God’s self-revelation. Telling the truth about God does not mean presuming to know God in full, or even boasting about God in part. In fact, telling the truth about God is an act of tremendous humility. It means honestly professing the ways that God reveals Godself, even when those ways seem contrary to what we expect of God, what we want of God, and what we think we understand about the ways of God. We long for a *deus ex machina*, a god who sweeps in from off-stage to rescue victims and bring evil-doers to their knees. But that is not the God that experience gives to us. We are given a baby—a poor baby, an illegitimate baby. We are given a man—a carpenter, a Nazarene. The God of human experience is, time and time again, a God of paradox, of surprises, and of unreasonable revelations. Reinhold Niebuhr writes, “The crux of the cross is its revelation of the fact that the final power of God over man is derived from the self-imposed weakness of his love.”<sup>xvii</sup> A theologian of the cross speaks in honest humility about that which confounds the mind and astounds the heart: the power of God’s weakness, the life made new by God’s death.

Speaking the impossible truth that God makes Godself known in God’s apparent opposite, the theologian of the cross humbly insists that God reveals Godself even—and perhaps especially—at the site of genocide. God practices compassionate solidarity with humanity, refusing to protect Godself from the pain of remaining with us even in the most horrific of circumstances. To seek

God at the site of genocide is to seek that element of compassionate solidarity that resists all attempts to remove it from its place in and among human life.

We return now to the question with which this paper began; namely, what is the essence of the human person such that violence lacks the power to de-humanize? I argue that the essence of humanity is constituted by the compassion, solidarity, and paradoxical self-revelation of God. At the center of the human person is God's gift of Godself, given in the mode of offer prior to creation. God's act of self-giving creates its own recipient.

Our guiding question misleads, however, for the essence of the human person is not a *what* but a *who*. The image of God is not a *what* but a *who*, namely, Jesus Christ. *Jesus Christ* is the compassionate solidarity of God. *Jesus Christ* is God hidden beneath God's apparent opposite. *Jesus Christ* is the irrevocable Image of God given in free grace to humanity. God has given Godself to humanity in the mode of eternal Word and Brother among us. This gift—a free outpouring of God's most compassionate solidarity—has been given once and for all. Once: The incarnation is an irrevocable historical event that has transformed and is transforming all of history. It is a Word that cannot be unspoken, a promise already fulfilled. For all: it is the essential, constitutive element of humanity as such.

But for all our pretty talk about essences and constituting elements, the reality remains that the human person is vulnerable to the destructive forces of violence. That is nowhere seen more unequivocally than at the site of genocide. As the bombing of the Sarajevo National Library evidences, violence attacks culture, memory, and history. Violence against human bodies—particularly sexualized violence—assaults our personhood, our sense of self, and our experience as embodied creatures. Violence intended to distort relationships undercuts our ability to trust, to form new relationships, and to love others and ourselves.

Though irreducible, the image of God is not beautiful. It does not rectify or redeem, glorify or glamorize violence. When all else has been striped away, when violence and violation have stolen our sense of self, our relationships, our life, the image of God that remains is Jesus Christ the crucified. God becomes humanity on our behalf, constituting the human person as such when nothing else can. When violence strips all of the *whats* of our lives, Jesus Christ is the essential *who* that remains. The essence of the humanity is the gift of Godself—not the image of a powerful Creator, not the image of a mighty Messiah, but the image of God the crucified.

In summary, I have argued that doing theological anthropology “under the cross” results in an understanding of the human person and of the divine image that takes seriously the reality of genocidal violence and the redemptive presence of an incarnate, crucified God. The human person, I have contended, does have an essential element, a “something” that differentiates it from other animals. This “something” is the image of God. The content of the image of God is not a capacity or a quality, not relationality or eschatological destiny, for each of these things can be distorted by extreme violence. We are constituted by the gift of God’s irreducible image.

This image, the very constitutive element of our humanity is itself cruciform. The image of God that we bear is ugly and vulnerable, broken and forsaken. And yet, the theology of the cross reminds us, the glory of God is hidden beneath its apparent opposite. While confounding to reason, experience of the foolishness of God and God’s paradoxical revelations bids us to look more closely at the ugly and vulnerable, the broken and forsaken—in ourselves, in our neighbors, and in Christ himself. For it is there—under the shadow of the cross, at the site of genocide—that God reveals God’s beauty and power, God’s wholeness and eternal hospitality.

### **Ethical Implications: How Ought We to Be Oriented to Our World?**

One final consideration remains. Douglas John Hall has said that the theology of the cross “seeks to become an ethic,” to move us into deeper engagement with the world. As human beings constituted

by the image of a crucified God, what posture ought we to take in reference to this world? Though the ethical implications of doing theological anthropology “under the cross,” are many, I want to point to two in particular: reverence toward individual human beings in their particularity and perception of individual human beings as members of the body of Christ.

I have argued that the essential element in the human person is the gift of Jesus Christ, who constitutes our humanity with his own. Jesus Christ is the essential *who* of human life. Paul confesses the truth of this in his own life: “I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2.19b-20a). Does this claim negate the integrity of the individual self? Does this dishonor the particular personhood of each human being? It is not God who dishonors the integrity of individual people, but violence and those who commit it. Extreme violence systematically attempts to strip the human person of his or her own selfhood. To say that violence does not have such power is dishonest. God does not desire the disintegration of personhood, but neither is God naïve, pretending that humans do not do such violence to one another. Therefore, in an act of compassionate solidarity, God has placed Godself at the center of who we are so that when violence is done to the human person, so violence is done to God. In this way Jesus taught his disciples, “Truly I tell you, just as you did to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me” (Matt 25.40). For God so loved the particular self of every human being whom God had made, that God gave God’s own particular self—Jesus Christ—in order that we might not die, but have life through him.

Ethically, therefore, we ought to orient ourselves to one another as we orient ourselves to God. We ought to show reverence to each human person as a particular and irreplaceable self, one to whom God has given Godself. In this way the feminist critique of the normative human person is addressed, for this theological anthropology does not prescribe a normative human person with normative qualities. It honors as beautiful and needed each particular human being to whom God

has given Godself. It respects that no human person is interchangeable for another. However, by pointing to Jesus Christ as our un-constructed, essential center, it also refuses to leave the human person vulnerable to ultimate reduction to something less than human. As followers of this God, we are called to do the same: to love human beings in their particularities, to refuse to do violence to one another, and when human beings come under the threat of violence to stand with them in compassion and solidarity.

The second ethical implication is inspired by the work of Ian McFarland. He claims that no human person bears the image of God unto themselves, for “God is not reducible to any finite reality even when fully present in it.”<sup>xviii</sup> Only by looking to the whole Body of Christ can we see the image of God rightly. Humanity as a whole—the living body of Christ—bears the image of God. McFarland writes, “Jesus’ visibility is inseparable from his having a body composed of an indefinite number of creatures who have been made in the divine image.”<sup>xix</sup> This means that the human family desperately needs each of its members. These members are not interchangeable, but needed in themselves and as themselves. The ethical mandate, therefore, is not only to honor and cherish each concrete, particular human person as one constituted in her humanity by a God who has given the gift of Godself in Jesus Christ, but is also to work for a world without violence, a world where no human community is “cleansed” from the earth, so that the Body of Christ might be made known.

Jesus Christ—the image of God that constitutes our humanity as individuals and as a whole—stands in nonviolent protest before every force of violence in our world and in our selves. When we take up the duo-fold ethical mandate, we stand with him, living into the reality that constitutes our being itself: the image of a crucified God, broken that we might be whole.

### **Conclusion**

When I visited Bosnia in the spring of 2008, I had the honor of meeting one of the librarians who survived the war. He had been in the library when the bombing began, keeping company with a dozen refugees living in the stacks after their homes were destroyed. This unlikely community ran in and out of the burning building to save as much of the library's rare book collection as possible. Two truck loads of books were rescued from the building and were hidden in the back rooms and basements of many homes for the remainder of the war. Among the saved: an ancient *Haggadah*, an even older *Hadith*, and historical accounts of the development of the Bosnian and Cyrillic languages.

The old library still in ruins, I met the librarian in a laboratory he rents at the University of Sarajevo. Here he gave a tour of the second phase of his rescue effort: rare book restoration. After years of sitting on damp basement shelves and in humid attics, the books must be disinfected before the librarian restores them page by page with scalpels and needles and fine-haired brushes. A single book requires months of his attention. When asked why he risked his life to save the books from the library, why he spends his life restoring them one page at a time, he answered, "So that this war does not get last word about us."

Genocide does not get the last word. No force of violence, no threat to our particular personhoods, can claim the truth about who we are. Jesus Christ—the Image of the crucified God—is also the first and final Word. This Image and Word is the source of our resilience and our resistance to all that seeks to harm us. It is what constitutes our humanity when everything else about who we are has been taken away. Though genocide may strip a people of life and a place in world history, God speaks a Word that cannot be unsaid, a truth about what it is to be human that cannot be erased. It is the first Word of creation, the final Word about who we are that cannot be stripped away. It is the Word of Life.

---

<sup>i</sup> Kemal Bakarsic, "The Libraries of Sarajevo and the Book That Saved our Lives," *The New Combat: A Journal of Reason and Resistance*, 3:13-15, 1994. [http://newcombat.net/article\\_thelibraries.html](http://newcombat.net/article_thelibraries.html)

<sup>ii</sup> Ibid.

- 
- <sup>iii</sup> Alexander Laben Hinton, *Annihilating Difference: the Anthropology of Genocide*, (University of California Press, 2002).
- <sup>iv</sup> Serene Jones, *Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace*, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000) 33.
- <sup>v</sup> Alistair I. McFadyen, *The Call to Personhood: a Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990) 19.
- <sup>vi</sup> Ibid 22.
- <sup>vii</sup> Harriet Harris, "Should We Say that Personhood is Relational?" *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 51:2 (1998) 224.
- <sup>viii</sup> McFadyen 19.
- <sup>ix</sup> Jurgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (London: S.C.M. Press Ltd, 1973) 3. Emphasis mine.
- <sup>x</sup> Douglas John Hall, "The Theology of the Cross: A Usable Past," 2.
- <sup>xi</sup> Martin Luther, *Heidelberg Disputation*, 21<sup>st</sup> thesis. Translation from the German by Douglas John Hall, Ibid 4.
- <sup>xii</sup> Ibid 5.
- <sup>xiii</sup> All Scripture citations from the NRSV (Division of Christian Education of the National Council of Churches of Christ, 1989).
- <sup>xiv</sup> Hall 6.
- <sup>xv</sup> Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Letters and Papers from Prison*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald Fuller (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 185-186. As quoted by Hall, 4.
- <sup>xvi</sup> United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, General Assembly resolution 260 A (III), 9 Dec. 1948. [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p\\_genoci.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)
- <sup>xvii</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Power and Weakness of God," *Discerning the Signs of the Times: Sermons for Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Charles' Scribner's Sons, 1946) 134. Quoted by Douglas John Hall, 8.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Ian McFarland, *The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005) 149.
- <sup>xix</sup> Ibid 165.